The Scope of Bribery under the Travel Act by Gabriel, D. Bruce
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 70
Issue 3 Fall Article 3
Fall 1979
The Scope of Bribery under the Travel Act
D. Bruce Gabriel
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
D. Bruce Gabriel, The Scope of Bribery under the Travel Act, 70 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 337 (1979)
9901-4169/79/7003-0337S02.00/0
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 1979 by Northwestern University School of Law
THE SCOPE OF BRIBERY UNDER THE TRAVEL ACT
INTRODUCTION
The Travel Act' makes bribery in violation of
state or federal law a federal offense. The meaning
of this prohibition is currently a source of contro-
versy between the Fourth, Fifth, and Second Cir-
cuits. The specific question that has split the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits from the Second Circuit is
whether commercial bribery2 is encompassed under
the Travel Act's prohibitions.
The Travel Act was passed in response to the
determination by'the Department of Justice that
local law enforcement authorities, burdened by the
depredations of organized crime,3 were without the
1 The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), provides:
Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in
aid of racketeering enterprises
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign com-
merce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce, including the mail, with intent to-
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activ-
ity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any
unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry
on, or facilitate the promotion, management, eslab-
lishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter erforms or attempts to perform any
of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and
(3), shall be fined not iore than $10,000 or im-
prisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means
(1) any busifiess enterprise' involving gambling, liq-
uor on which the Federal excise tax has not been
paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as defined
in Section*102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act),
or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of
ihe State in which they are committed 'or of the
United States, or (2) extortion, bribery, or arson in
violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of
the United States.
(c) Investigations of violations under this section
inVolving liquor shall be conducted under the su-
pervision of the Secretary of the Treasury.
(Emphasis added).
Commercial bribery is defined by two sections of the
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 180.00 and 180.05 (McKinney 1975).
They deal with the conferring of any benefit upon; or the
receipt of any benefit by, an employee, agent, or fiduciary
without the consent of the latter's employer or principal,
with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his
employer's or principal's affairs.
Louisiana defines commercial bribery in a single sec-
tion comparable to the two New York sections, LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14:73 (West 1974).
.'For discussions of the nature and degree of organized
means necessary to strike at the heart of these
criminal operations, since their locus was often
beyond the state's jurisdiction.4 Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy submitted the bill, which blos-
somed into the Travel Act, as part of his legislative
program designed to aid local law enforcement
authorities in their efforts to combat organized
crime.5
The draft legislation provided that either a busi-
ness enterprise involving gambling, liquor, narcot-
ics, or prostitution offenses, or extortion or bribery,
in violation of the laws of the state where commit-
ted or of the United States was to serve as the
criminal activity in America at the time the Travel Act
was enacted, see Johnson, Organized Crime: Challenge to the
American Legal System, Part I: Organized Crime: The Nature of
Its Threat, The Reasons for Its Survival, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 399 (1962); Miller, The "Travel Act'. A New Statutory
Approach to Organized Crime in the United States, I DuQ. L.
REv. 181, 181-83 (1963); Pollner, Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy's Legislative Program to Curb Organized Crime and
Racketeering, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 37 (1961); Woetzel,
Organized Crime in America, 4 CRiM. L. REv. 611 (1963). See
also the testimony of Herbert Miller describing gambling,
prostitution, liquor, and narcotics offenses as four types
of offenses which were known to be linked to organized
crime, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Rack-
eteering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings].
' See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House
Judiciary Committee on Legislation Relating to Organized Crime,
87th Cong., Ist Sess. 20-24 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings]. Attorney General Kennedy stated: "In
summary, our information reveals numerous instances
where the prime mover in a gambling or other illegal
enterprise operates by remote control form the safety of
another State-sometimes half a continent away. He
sends henchmen to the scene of operations or travels
himself from time to time to supervise the activity and
check on his underlings. As for the profits, he receives his
share by messenger." Id. at 23. See also S. REP. No. 644,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 966, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. 2,3 (1961).
5S. 1653, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Pollner, supra
note 3, at 38 n. 9. See also S. Rep. No. 644, supra note 4,
at 2, for the letter included by Kennedy with the draft
legislation; Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 16; Kennedy,
The Program of the Department of Justice.on Organized Crime,
38 NOTRE DAME L. 637, 637-39 (1962)t For additional
background and information on the enactment process,
see Connor, The Travel Act: Its Limitation by the Senth
Circuit in the Context of Local Political Corruption, 52 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 505, 505-08 (1975); Miller, supra note 3, at
181; Pollner, supra note 3, at 37-42.
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underlying offense of the Travel Act.6 The business
enterprise requirement was included, according to
the Attorney General, because the Department of
Justice was "not trying to curtail the sporadic,
casual involvement in these offenses, but rather a
continuous course of conduct sufficient for it to be
termed a business enterprise.",7 Since bribery and
extortion as practiced by organized criminals tends
to be composed of discrete instances of improper
influence,8 the business enterprise requirement was
not attached to the bribery or extortion offenses in
the proposed or adopted legislation.9
Whether commercial bribery was meant to be
encompassed by this Act was not clearly indicated.
Several courts have addressed this issue and
reached different conclusions.
6 Pollner, supra note 3, at 39. Set also text accompanying
notes 47-50 infra.
7 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 16.
8 See text accompanying note 61 infra and notes 59-62
infra.
9 Miller, supra note 3, at 195-96. The House took the
Senate-passed bill and narrowed the unlawful activities
of extortion and bribery to cover only "extortion or
bribery in connection with gambling, liquor, narcotics,
or prostitution." H.R. REP. No. 966, supra note 4, at 2.
The conference committee struck the requirement
added by the House that extortion or bribery be in
connection with one of the enumerated unlawful business
enterprises. This decision to drop the restrictive language
was likely in response to then Deputy Attorney General
Byron R. White's letter of August 7, 1961, protesting the
limitation on behalf of the Department ofJustice. It read
in part:
The effect is to require proof that there was a
continuous course of conduct involving extortion or
bribery in connection with gambling, liquor, nar-
cotics, or prostitution. It eliminated from the pur-
view of the bill extortions not related to the four
above offenses but which are, and have historically
been, activities which involve organized crime. Such
activities as the "shakedown racket," "shylocking"
(where interest of 20% per week is charged and
which is collected by means of force and violence,
since in most states the loans are uncollectible in
court) and labor extortion. It also removes from the
purview of the bill the bribery of state, local and
federal officials by the organized criminals unless
we can prove that the bribery is directly attributable
to gambling, liquor, narcotics or prostitution.
The Department is strongly opposed to this
amendment and recommends that the Committee
accept and report the proposal with respect to ex-
tortion and bribery as submitted by the Department
and as passed by the Senate.
Letter from Byron R. White, Deputy Attorney General,
to the Honorable Emmanuel Celler, Chairman, House
Committee on the Judiciary, August 7, 1961. See also
Pollner, supra note 3, at 41.
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THE CONFLICTING CASES
In United States v. Pomponio'° the defendants were
charged with violating the Travel Act by making
payments to a bank officer for the purpose of
influencing his conduct with respect to loans made
by his employer-bank to corporations owned or
controlled by the defendants. The indictable state
law "unlawful activity" upon which the prosecu-
tion relied was the offense of commercial bribing
under New York law." The defendant, however,
argued that commercial bribing was outside the
scope of the Travel Act which, they maintained,
prohibited only bribery as known at common law.'
2
Under the common law, "bribery is the offense of
giving or receiving money or anything of value in
return for which a public officer agrees to do or
refrain from doing an act, contrary to his legal
duty."'3 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that
bribery, as used in the Travel Act, referred to
bribery in a generic sense and was not restricted to
its common-law meaning.' 4 Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit found that bribery of persons other than
public officials, when prohibited by a state law,
constitutes an "unlawful activity" for purposes of
the Travel Act.' s
• 16
In United States v. Perrin, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the broader definition of bribery adopted by
the Fourth Circuit. The defendants in Perrin were
charged with using interstate facilities with intent
to promote a commercial bribery scheme in viola-
tion of the laws of Louisiana. 17 As in Pomponio, the
target of the bribery scheme was a private em-
10511 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
874 (1975).
" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00 (McKinney 1975); See
note 2, supra.
12 511 F.2d at 956.
13 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 1380
(emphasis added). (1957). See also BISHOP ON CRIMINAL
LAW, § 85(t) (9th ed. 1923); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
239 (4th ed. 1968).
14 511 F.2d at 956. Although the generic meaning of
bribery is not specifically defined, it apparently refers to
the act or practice of bestowing upon, or promising
money or a favor "to a person in a position of trust to
pervert hisjudgment or corrupt his conduct." WESTER'S
SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 104 (19th ed.
1971).
'511 F.2d at 957.
16580 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3615, 3616 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1979) (No. 78-959);
see note 2 supra for the applicable commercial bribery
statute.
17 580 F.2d at 732. See note 2 supra for a summary of
the Louisiana statute.
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ployee.'8 The court rejected defendants' argument
that Pomponio had been decided incorrectly and
held that "the term 'bribery' is a generic one not
limited to its meaning in common law."'"
In the interim between the Fourth and Fifth
Circuit decisions, the Second Circuit decided United
States v. Brecht.2° Brecht involved an alleged violation
of the same New York commercial bribery statute
at issue in Pomponio.2" The defendant, who had
responsibility for awarding certain subcontracts for
his employer, demanded a bribe from a subcon-
tractor as a condition to. receiving a contract. 2
After noting that district judges in the Second
Circuit had split upon the issue of whether such
unlawful activity rose to a federal offense under
the Travel Act,! and after giving consideration to
the affirmative view expressed by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the Second Circuit held that the Travel Act
does not encompass the crime of commercial brib-
ery.
24
INTERPRETATION OF THE BRIBERY PROVISION
The ultimate quest of this article is the deter-
mination of the meaning which Congress intended
to be attached to a single word in the Travel Act-
bribery. This is in accord with the duty which
rested upon the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits,
and which now faces the United States Supreme
Court, for the obligation of courts in construing
legislation is to give effect to the intent of Con-
gress.2
5
s 580 F.2d at 733.
19 Id.
2o United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
21 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.05 (McKinney 1975); see
note 2 supra. This case involved receiving a commercial
bribe as opposed to paying a commerical bribe. See 540
F.2d at 47.
2 540 F.2d at 47. The defendant was also charged with
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976) (the Hobbs Act).
2See United States v. Niedelman, 356 F.Supp. 979
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
2 540 F.2d at 48-50.
2 5United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 3 10 U.S.
534, 542 (1940); see 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON.
srRuCTION, §§ 45.01-45.08 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 2A
SUTHERLAND]. This standard of interpretation is not with-
out competition. It has also been asserted that one must
look to the meaning of the statute as understood by those
to whom it is directed. These two standards need not
necessarily diverge. Presumably the legislature chooses its
language with some appreciation of how those to whom
it is addressed will understand it; and conversely, those
to whom the language is directed ordinarily reach an
understanding of it with reference to its source. In ap-
This article will present and analyze the argu-
ments raised by the circuit courts in reaching their
conclusions. Attention will be directed at the outset
to the facial meaning of the statute. The legislative
history of the Travel Act will be examined and
principles of statutory construction applied to de-
termine which circuit court of appeals has inter-
preted the Travel Act correctly.
THE FACIAL MEANING OF THE ACT
Prefaced by the observation that the Travel Act
is a penal statute and deserved strict construction, "5
the defendant in Pomponio raised the plain-meaning
doctrine.27 He contended that by referring specifi-
proaching this analysis from the standpoint of Congress'
intended meaning of bribery, rather than bribery as
understood by the general public, (presumably in accord
with WEBSTER'S definition, see note 14 supra), my rationale
is that only the conduct which Congress intended to be
criminal ought to be covered. This is in agreement with
the doctrine that penal statutes should be strictly con-
strued. See note 32, infra. Secondly, one might reason that
the statute is directed more toward organized criminals
than toward the general public, and it is the organized
criminals' understanding which is relevant-which may
be indicated by the sort of bribery with which organized
crime is typically associated.
26 It is a traditional principle that penal statutes are to
be strictly construed against the Government and only
conduct clearly falling within them is to be prosecuted.
See United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297
(1971); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348, 349
(1948); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485
(1916); United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624,628 (1890);
3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrON, §§ 59.01-59.09
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 3 SUTHERLAND]: The rationale
for strict construction is that a person should have notice
of the conduct prohibited, that he should be protected
from arbitrary administration of criminal laws which act
only upon the individual, and that the judiciary should
exercise care not to legislate in construing statutes. Id. at
§ 59.03.
27 Brief for appellee at 15, 16, 17, United States v.
Pomponio, 511 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1975); 511 F.2d at 453.
The plain meaning rule provides that "where the lan-
guage of an enactment is clear and construction accord-
ing to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the
final expression of the meaning intended." United States
v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). The
rule purports not to be a rule of construction, for its
command is that "where the language is plain and admits
of no more than one meaning the duty of the interpre-
tation does not arise and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion." Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916). However, it has
been recognized that this literalistic approach is, in fact,
a form of interpretation, for words simply do not have
intrinsic meanings. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, at §§
45.02, 46.02. Courts often give recognition to the rule,
19791
cally to bribery, rather than commercial bribery or
bribery in a generic sense-which are "plainly
distinct from the crime of bribery"-the Travel
Act ought to be limited to the narrower type of
activity clearly encompassed by the statute.2
However, spch a contention, without more, sim-
ply states the conclusion. In other words, it is not
clear from the face of the statute that the term
"bribery" describes an offense distinct from com-
mercial bribery. To hold that it does would require
an implicit assumption that the term is used in its
common-law sense rather than generically. While
the defendant did point to the fact that bribery
and commercial bribery refer to plainly distinct
offenses under the New York codification of bribery
offenses,29 his point is of questionable relevance
concerning congressional intent. Once this extra-
but rarely allow it to preclude consideration of legislative
history. They often state that the statutory language is
clear and that there is no need to look at the legislative
history, and then do so anyway. See, e.g., Greyhound
Corp. v. Mount Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, (1978);
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, (1978); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). Furthermore, de-
spite frequent restatements of the rule, it has been un-
dermined by the United States Supreme Court's state-
ment that, "when aid to construction of the meaning of
words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly
can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however
clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination."'
United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534,
543-44 (1940). See also United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S.
371, 374 n.4 (1978); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest
Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9, 10 (1976); Cass v.
United States, 417 U.S. 72, 78, 79 (1974).
28426 U.S. at 16, 17.
2 Id. at 11; see note 2, supra, for a summary of the New
York commercial bribery statutes. § 200.00 of the N.Y.
PENAL LAW appears as follows:
Bribery in the second degree
A person is guilty of bribery in the second degree
when he confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any
benefit upon a public servant upon an agreement
of understanding that such public servant's vote,
opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of
discretion as a public servant will thereby be influ-
enced.
Bribery in the second degree is a class D felony.
A class D felony carries a maximum term of
imprisonment of seven years.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1975).
A similar argument could be raised on the basis of
Louisiana's separate codification of commercial bribery
and public bribery. The Louisiana public bribery statute
reads:
Public bribery
Public bribery is the giving or offering to give,
directly or indirectly, anything of apparent present
or prospective value to any of the following persons,
with the intent to influence his conduct in relation
to his position, employment, or duty:
neous information is applied to the text, it merely
describes what the New York legislature regarded
as bribery, rather than what Congress intended
bribery to cover in the Travel Act. Of course,
congressional knowledge of the distinct definitions
might indicate that it used "bribery" as the New
York legislature would understand the term.3 This
presupposes greater knowledge and consideration
of this specific question than is evident in the
legislative history of the Travel Act.
3 1
Furthermore, under federal law, there are a
number of sections prohibiting various types of
bribery, not all of which involve the bribery of
public officials.32 The court in Perrin suggested that
it would be incongruous for Congress to have
intended to outlaw only the bribery of public
officials in the Travel Act when it had proscribed
commercial bribery in other statutes. 3
(1) Public officer or public employee; or
(2) Election official at any general, primary, or
special election; or
(3) Grand or petit juror; or
(4) Witness, or person about to be called as a
witness, upon a trial or other proceeding be-
fore any court, board, or officer authorized to
hear evidence or to take testimony.
(5) Any person who has been elected or ap-
pointed to public office, whether or not said
person has assumed the title or duties of such
office.
The acceptance of, or the offer to accept, directly
or indirectly, anything of apparent present or pro-
spective value, under such circumstances, by any of
the above named persons, shall also constitute pub-
lic bribery.
Whoever commits the crime of public bribery
shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars,
or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not
more than five years, or both.
LSA-R.S. 14:118 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:148 (West
1974).
3 See note 25, supra.
3' There is very little discussion ofbribery as prohibited
by the Travel Act in either the House Hearings, note 4
supra, or the Senate Hearings, note 3 supra. Nor does one
find a definitive statement as to the word's meaning in
any of the committee reports. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 644,
supra note 4; H.R. REp. No. 966, supra note 4. See text
accompanying notes 56-58 infra, for a discussion of the
references to bribery in the legislative history of the
Travel Act.
2 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (bribery of public
officials and witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1976) (bribery
of athletes); 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1976) (bribery of bank
officers); 49 U.S.C. § 1(17) (1976) (bribery of agents and
employees of carriers by rail); 7 U.S.C. §§ 60, 85 (1976)
(bribery of licensed classifiers of cotton or any grain); 47
U.S.C. § 509 (1976) (bribery in connection with any quiz
show).
3 580 F.2d at 734.
COMMENTS [Vol. 70
BRIBERY UNDER THE TRAVEL ACT
This view is supported by Herbert Miller, As-
sistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, De-
partment of Justice at the time Congress passed
the Travel Act. In a law review article published
after passage of the Act, Miller cited a number of
federal bribery statues not involving public officials
when he observed that any extortion or bribery in
violation of state or federal law would amount to
an "unlawful activity" under the Travel Act.'
In interpreting the Travel Act, reliance upon
Miller's citation of federal bribery statutes not
involving public officials suffers from a major
weakness. A serious question arises as to how indic-
ative of congressional intent such an observation is.
Miller's view on this issue never appeared in his
testimony .before Congressas and certainly could
not be regarded as having been adopted by any
Congressmen.
Nor is it necessarily true that Congress, which
had proscribed bribery of nonpublic officials in
numerous other statutes,3s was acting incon-
gruously if it meant to limit bribery under the
Travel Act solely to the bribery of public officials.
The reasonableness of such a limitation must be
appraised in light of the statute's purpose. Since
the statute was addressed to organized crime, if
bribery practiced by organized crime typically
takes the form of bribery of public officials, then it
would be sensible for Congress to limit the Act to
common law bribery. In addition, the existence of
specific, nongeneric descriptions of bribery offenses
elsewhere in the United States Code raises the
question why Congress did not proscribe bribery
offenses beyond those known at common law with
similar specificity in the Travel Act if it meant to
include them. 7
What is plain from this discussion is that the
meaning of bribery in the Travel Act is not plain
at all. The meaning instead is unclear and ambig-
uous. In the face of this ambiguity, the doctrine
that penal statutes are to be strictly construed
against the government, as combined with the prin-
ciple that "one is not to be subjected to a penalty
unless the words of the statute plainly impose it,",3
9
supports the contention that "bribery" within the
Miller, supra note 3, at 196 n. 60.
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 102, 243, 281, 314;
House Hearings, supra note 4, at 335.
36 See note 32 supra.
37 United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d at 739 (Rubin, J.,
dissenting).
38 See note 26 supra.
'* Keppel v. Tiffin Say. Bank, 197 U.S. 356,362 (1905).
See also United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485
(1916); United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624,628 (1890).
Travel Act should be limited to bribery at common
law. However, the rule of strict construction is not
to be applied without reference to other principles
of statutory construction, all of which are directed
to discovery of the legislature's intent.40 In partic-
ular, penal statutes "are not to be construed so
strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the
legislature."" 1 Therefore, before the doctrine of
strict construction may be allowed to determine
the outcome, resort must be had to the statute's
purpose, legislative history, and other construc-
tional aids.42 If after this inquiry, the legislature's
intention as to the meaning of bribery remains
ambiguous, then the ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of lenity to the accused.4
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT
The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the Travel Act "was aimed primarily at
organized crime and, more specifically, at persons
who reside in one State while operating or man-
aging illegal activities located in another." This
is in accord with the objectives of the legislation as
described by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
and Assistant Attorney General Herbert Miller in
testimony before Senate and House committees
conducting hearings on the proposed bill.' Ken-
nedy stated: "The main target of our bill is inter-
state travel to promote gambling. It also is aimed
at the huge profits in the traffic in liquor, narcotics,
prostitution, as well as the use of these funds for
corrupting local officials and for their use in rack.
eteering in labor and management".46 Miller
added that with respect to the four business enter-
prise offenses denominated in section 1952(b)(1),
40 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note 26, at §§ 59.06, 59.08,
(history and purpose of legislation, common law meaning
of words, and construction of other parts of the text). See
also Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 567-68
(1977).
41 134 U.S. at 628. See also Kordel v. United States, 335
U.S. 345, 349 (1948), wherein it is stated that "there is no
canon against using common sense in reading a criminal
law, so that strained and technical constructions do not
defeat its purpose by creating exceptions or loopholes in
it."
4 See note 40 supra.
43 Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 568; United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401
U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
44 Rewis, 401 U.S. at 811. See also Erlenbaugh v. United
States, 409 U.S. 239, 245 (1972).
41 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 16 (testimony of
Kennedy), 102 (testimony of Miller); House Hearings, supra
note 4, at 20 (testimony of Kennedy), 336 (testimony of
Miller).
46 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 20.
19791
342 coA
"we were attempting to limit the scope of this
statute to certain types of business that we know
are allied with organized crime."
4 7
These statements, and the statute which mirrors
them, are apparently accurate reflections of the
activities of organized crime at the time the Travel
Act was passed. At that time, criminal organiza-
tions appeared "most active in six fields of en-
deavor-illegal gambling, the distribution of nar-
cotics, racketeering, prostitution, 'shylocking,' and
the infiltration of legitimate business... ,,4a The
near identity between the activities of organized
crime and the activities prohibited in the Travel
Act lends additional weight to the conclusion that
the bill was addressed to organized crime.
9
Despite the clear overall purpose of the statute,
it is well recognized that one need not be a member
of "organized crime" to fall within its reach.5° The
probable explanation for Congress's decision not to
make some degree of association with a criminal
organization an element of the offense is that such
a narrow wording of the statute would have pro-
vided a means of evasion. 51 Rather, Congress used
the "business enterprise" requirement in subsection
(b)(1) of the Travel Act as a limiting device which
would encompass the unlawful activities of orga-
nized criminals, but which would allow exclusion
of the isolated involvement in these activities by
persons not allied with organized crime.5 2 This
overinclusive wording, which was apparently in-
tended, has led to the application of the Travel Act
47 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 107.
48 Johnson, supra note 3, at 399, 403-05.
'9 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, at §§ 48.01-48.03.
5 United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Phillips, 433
F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 884-86 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Deardorff, 343 F.Supp. 1033, 1037 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
s' 432 F.2d at 885.
52 Id. at 885, 886. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 3,
at 17, where Kennedy stated:
Let me say from the outset that we do not seek or
intend to impede the travel ofanyone except persons
engaged in illegal businesses as spelled out in the
bill. We specifically have outlined the illicit opera-
tions we seek to curtail as those involving gambling,
liquor, narcotics, prostitution businesses or extortion
or bribery in violation of State or Federal law.
The target clearly is organized crime. The travel
that would be banned is travel "in furtherance of a
business enterprise" which involves gambling, liq-
uor, narcotics, and prostitution offenses or extortion
or bribery. Obviously, we are not trying to curtail
the sporadic, casual involvement in these offenses,
but rather a continuous course of conduct sufficient
for it to be termed a business enterprise.
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to persons engaged in gambling, liquor, narcotics,
and prostitution offenses whether or not they are
members of organized crime, so long as there is a
''continuous course of conduct" in the unlawful
activity.
"5
Furthermore, since there is no business enterprise
requirement associated with the unlawful activities
of extortion, bribery, or arson, in many prosecu-
tions for bribery under the Travel Act, there has
not been any evidence of organized criminal activ-
ity.5 This application of the term bribery is over-
inclusive in view of the overall purpose of the
statute. Yet, the fact that it has captured persons
not associated with organized crime within its
scope does not necessarily mean that Congress did
not intend that the word be construed in a sense
consistent with the ordinary form bribery takes
when practiced by organized criminals, that is, the
bribery of public officials.55 Overinclusiveness
which is necessary to accomplish the objectives of
the legislation does not justify added overinclusive-
ness which does nothing to promote the purposes
of the statute.
The legislative history of the Travel Act indicates
an intention to prevent the corruption of local
officials. At the same time, however, none of the
congressional committee reports makes any direct
reference to the meaning of the term "bribery."
' 6
s3 432 F.2d at 885; United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d
856, 874 (9th Cir. 1974); Spinelli v. United States, 382
F.2d 871, 890 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 393
U.S. 410 (1969).
United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Rauhoff,
525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Isaacs,
493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Deardorff, 343 F.Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
s Prosecutions for bribery under the Travel Act ap-
pear to almost invariably involve the bribery of public
officials. The cases cited in note 54 supra exemplify this.
The eases involving commercial bribery appear to be
virtually the only exceptions. But see United States v.
Michael, 456 F.Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 1978), in which pros-
ecution for bribery of a bank officer in violation of state
and federal statutes was allowed. There is also language
in United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 47 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977), suggesting that
bribery prosecutions under the Travel Act need not be
limited to situations involving the bribery of public offi-
cials. But see United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127,
1137 n.23 (3d Cir. 1977), which seems to suggest that the
Travel Act simply applies to bribery of public officials.
5 S. REP. No. 644, supra note 4, at 1-6; H.R. REP. No.
966, supra note 4, at 1-5; H.R. REP. No. 1161, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1961).
BRIBERY UNDER THE TRAVEL ACT
Only the overall purpose of the Act gives any
indication of the meaning. Nevertheless, the hear-
ings do tend to show that Congress was probably
thinking about bribery of public officials when it
used the word bribery, for there are numerous
references to the problem of the corruption of local
officials. 57 For example, one such reference was
made by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy"
"Organized crime is nourished by a number of
activities, but the primary source of its growth is
illicit gambling. From huge gambling profits flow
the funds to bankroll the other illegal activities I




These circumstantial comments are certainly not
conclusive evidence that bribery was to be limited
to the bribery of public officials; yet, in view of the
absence of any reference to bribery of anyone other
than public officials, it may be reasonable to limit
the scope of the prohibition to the apparent extent
of Congress' thought on the matter.
An additional piece of circumstantial evidence
which may shed some light on Congress's concep-
tion of bribery in the context of the Travel Act
may be found in the enactment process itself. The
House amended the version of the bill originally
passed by the Senate by adding the requirement
that the extortion and bribery prohibited in sub-
section (b)(2) be "in connection with gambling,
liquor, narcotics, or prostitution. " 59 Byron R.
White, then Deputy Attorney General, vigorously
protested the limiting language in a letter to Em-
manuel Celler, Chairman of the House Committee
on the Judiciary.60 The conference committee ap-
parently acquiesced to the criticism, for it reported
the bill, as subsequently passed, without the objec-
tionable language.6' White criticized the language
in part because, "[i]t... removes from the purview
of the bill the bribery of state, local, and federal
.,,7 See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 19, 20 (testimony
of Attorney General Kennedy), 105 (testimony of R.
Cramer), 253 (statement of commissioner Donald S.
Leonard, on behalf of the International Association of
Police Chiefs); Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at II (testi-
mony of Attorney General Kennedy), 109, 110 (testimony
of Assistant Attorney General Miller), 191 (Appendix III
Model Police Council Act and Commentary by Morris
Ploscove, N.Y. City Magistrate, Executive Director of
Commission on Organized Crime; Don L. Kooken, As-
sistant Professor, Police Administration, University of
Indiana, A.B.A. Commission on Organized Crime). See
also Kennedy, supra note 5, at 638.
' House Hearings, supra note 4, at 20.
r'
9 See note 9 supra.
c4 Id.
61 Id.
officials by the organized criminals unless we can
prove that the bribery is directly attributable to
gambling, liquor, narcotics, or prostitution. '
It is interesting that White's complaint refers
only to the greater difficulty which would face the
Department of Justice in prosecuting state, local
and federal officials, and makes no reference to a
loss of ability to prosecute the bribery of persons
other than public officials. It is more likely that the
form of bribery used in connection with gambling,
liquor, narcotics, and prostitution would be the
bribery of public officials rather than commercial
bribery, for the latter would be of little use in
securing protection for these illicit activities. Why
then does White not express even greater dismay
at the impact of the limiting language on the
ability to prosecute the bribery of private individ-
uals? This is perhaps because the Department of
Justice did not intend for bribery to encompass
anything other than common-law bribery even
before the amendment.
This negative inference is tenuously drawn and
must be approached with caution. In addition to
the fragile foundation upon which the conclusion
rests, an additional problem presents itself in this
instance, for even if the Department of Justice was
thinking in terms of the bribery of public officials,
another step is required to conclude that this mean-
ing was adopted by Congress. Still, it may not be
unreasonable to give some weight to this proposi-
tion, for Congress, in the form of a conference
committee, apparently considered and acted upon
the criticism of the House amendment. Further-
more, it is reasonable to believe that Congress
would attach some weight to the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation, for the Department of Jus-
tice had drafted and submitted the original bill, s
and Congress's understanding of the legislation was
necessarily shaped by the Justice Department's
interpretation and explanation of it.r Whether in
this particular situation, Congress noted and
adopted the negative inference apparent in the
letter is debatable. However, it is possible that the
letter focused the thoughts of Congressmen on the
common-law meaning of bribery, and that they
did not even conceive of its application to bribery
involving persons other than public officials.
This survey of the legislative history of the Travel
Act can hardly be said to lead to a definitive
- See note 40 supra.
r
3 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
" See, e.g., an explanatory letter of Attorney General
Kennedy included in the Congressional Record, 107
CONc. REc. 16541, 16542 (1961).
answer as to the meaning Congress intended brib-
ery to carry.6s The overall purpose of the Travel
Act is consistent with either a common-law or
generic definition of the word. That the generic
definition is overinclusive given the purpose of the
Act is supported by reference to studies which show
that the type of bribery which is typical of orga-
nized crime is the bribery of public officials. There
are also indications from the testimony in the
Congressional hearings and in the letter from then
Deputy Attorney General White that Congress was
probably thinking of bribery of public officials
when it used bribery in the Travel Act.
Yet, the Fifth Circuit discounted this evidence
in Perrin.66 The court reasoned that the underlying
crime need not be one typically associated with
organized crime and that it lacked the expertise to
make such a determination.6
7
While it is true that persons not associated with
organized crime are subject to prosecution under
the Travel Act, it is specious to suggest that the
purpose of the statute and its legislative history
may be disregarded in defining the terms of the
statute. Congress did not make "racketeering" an
element of the Act because it would have led to
easy evasion of the statute by organized criminals. 
8
But this does not mean that the purpose of the Act
should not be taken into account when attempting
to decipher ambiguous terms within the statute.
The legislative history of the Travel Act, although
not perfectly clear and unambiguous, is relevant
and should not be overlooked.
6 It was brought to the attention of the House subcom-
mittee during the hearings that bribery was an offense of
the common law. However, the context of the observation
was such that it is difficult to say whether the speaker
meant to imply that bribery, as it appears in the Travel
Act, was to carry its common-law meaning. Also, it is not
clear that the subcommittee members were aware, or at
least made aware, of the common law definition of the
term. However, given the fact that the subcommittee
members were at least made aware that bribery was a
common law offense, the rule that, "statutes are to be
interpreted with reference to the common law and gen-
erally be given their common law meaning absent some
indication to the contrary," United States v. Monasterski,
567 F.2d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 1977), lends support to the
view that "bribery" should be given its common law
meaning. See also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779,
783 (1952); 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, at §§ 50.01,
50.03, 50.04. There is still a problem in imputing the
knowledge that bribery was a common-law offense from
this single subcommittee to the Senate committee, let
alone the rest of Congress.
6 580 F.2d at 733.
67 id.
' See text accompanying note 51 supra.
Furthermore, it does not appear that one need
be an expert to make a determination as to whether
the bribery which is typically associated with or-
ganized crime is bribery in the common law sense
or bribery in a generic sense.' The Second Circuit
in Brecht did not ignore the purpose of the Travel
Act in defining bribery in its common-law sense.70
Although the purpose of the statute, its legislative
history, and the circumstances surrounding its en-
actment must be weighed in the context of their
own lack of clarity with respect to the particular
question which has arisen, to disregard this evi-
dence bearing on Congressional intent is to ignore
the United States Supreme Court's advice that one
"may utilize, in construing a statute not unambig-
uous, all the light relevantly shed upon the words
and the clause and the statute that express the
purpose of Congress... Particularly this is so when
we construe statutes defining conduct which entail
stigma and penalties and prison."
7
'
CONSTRUCTION OF OTHER WORDS IN THE ACT
In addition to the legislative history and purpose
of the Travel Act, the construction of other words
and phrases appearing in the statute may be
properly consulted in the search for the meaning
of "bribery."' 2 In particular, the meaning of sur-
rounding words should be taken into account.73 In
light of this principle of construction, the Second,
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits each gave considerable
weight to the construction of the term extortion by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Nardello.7 4
In Nardello, the defendants were allegedly in-
volved in a shakedown operation. 75 They were
charged with a violation of the Travel Act for
engaging in extortion in violation of state law.76 A
problem arose because Pennsylvania, the underly-
ing jurisdiction, defined extortion according to its
common-law definition, that is, "the obtaining of
property of another by a public official under the
color of his office when the property was not due
' See text accompanying notes 56-64 supra.
70 540 F.2d at 49, 50. See also United States v. Niedel-
man, 356 F.Supp. 979, 981, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
71 United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 221 (1952).
72 See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, at ch. 47.
7 3 Third Nat'l Bank v. Inpact Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 321
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976); Jarecki v. G.D. Searle and Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307
(1961).
74 United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969).75 Id. at 287.76 1d. at 288.
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either to the office or the official." 7 Pennsylvania
statutes denominated the conduct of the defend-
ants as "blackmail."78 The defendants contended
alternatively that the congressional definition of
extortion was to be restricted to its common law
meaning.79 The government urged a broad generic
construction of the term.80
The Court held that extortion was to be taken
in its generic sense as prohibiting all types of
extortionate conduct proscribed by the states,
whether a particular state labeled the conduct as
extortion, blackmail, or something else." In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Court carefully surveyed
the legislative history and purpose of the Act.82 It
recognized that construing extortion in its com-
mon-law sense would "conflict with the congres-
sional desire to curb the activities of organized
crime rather than merely organized criminals who
were also public officials.. .."8 The Court also
observed that if only conduct labeled extortion
were to be covered, the result would be a nonsen-
sical, nonuniform application of the statute."
Whether a state would receive federal assistance
under the Travel Act in prosecuting particular
extortionate conduct in violation of state law would
depend solely upon whether the state labeled the
offense "extortion." The Court could not perceive
77 Id at 288, 289.
7 Id at 288.
7 Id at 290.
8 Id.
8 Id. at 295, 296.
,2 The United States Supreme Court did not overlook
committee reports or testimony offered in the hearings,
and even cited then Deputy Attorney General White's
letter to the Chairman of the HouseJudiciary Committee
protesting the House amendment to subsection b(2) of
the Travel Act in its determination of the meaning of
"extortion." This suggests that there may well be similar
merit in giving consideration to these materials in at-
tempting to define "bribery," in spite of the reluctance of
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits to do so. See 393 U.S. at
290-96.
3 393 U.S. at 293. It should also be recognized that
the United States Supreme Court was not unwilling to
take notice of the nature of organized crime's extortionate
activities: "Extortion is typically employed by organized
crime to enforce usurious loans, infiltrate legitimate busi-
nesses, and obtain control of labor unions." Id. at 295,
n.13. Despite the Fifth Circuit's doubt as to whether it
could determine whether a crime was one typically as-
sociated with organized crime, it would have been justi-
fied in attempting to determine what sort of bribery is
typically associated with organized crime. The Second
Gircuit went no further than the Supreme Court went in
Nardello in taking cognizance of the nature of bribery
typically employed by organized criminals. See 540 F.2d
at 50. But see 580 F.2d at 733.8 393 U.S. at 294, 295.
any reason for concluding that Congress would
want to aid local law enforcement efforts in one
state, but not another, when both states have stat-
utes covering the substantive offense, but label it
differently.85 Therefore, the Court, in light of the
scope of the congressional purpose, declined to give
the term extortion the unnaturally narrow reading
pressed for by the defendants.s8
In Pomponio, the FourthfCircuit, faced with the
defendants' contention that bribery was to be lim-
ited to its common-law meaning, professed to have
found the answer to that assertion in the following
language from Nardello:
Appellees suggest, however, that Congress intended
that the common-law meaning of extortion-cor-
rupt acts by a public official be retained. If Congress
so intended, then § 1952 would cover extortionate
acts only when the extortionist was, also a public
official. Not only would such a construction conflict
with the congressional desire to curb the activities
of organized crime rather than merely organized
crimipals who were also public officials, but also §
1952 imposes penalties upon any individual crossing
state lines or using interstate facilities for any of the
statutorily enumerated offenses. The language of
the Travel Act, "whoever" crosses state lines or uses
interstate facilities, includes private persons as well
as public officials!'
The Court conclusorily stated upon the basis of
this language from Narddllo that it would not give
bribery an unnaturally narrow reading in light of
the scope of the congressional purpose.s
The Fourth Circuit opinion fails- to explain,
however,:how the common-law definitior of brib-
ery conflicts with the desire of Congress to curb the
activities of organized crime. Nor did the court
recognize that "whoever" refers to the briber. It is
accepted even by those who assert that the bribee
must be a public official, that the briber may be a
private individual. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit
in Perrin accepted the Fourth Circuit's reading of
Nardello and added that "it would be incongruous
to read the term extortion in its generic sense while
reading the term bribery in the literal common law
sense.
'm
Id. at 295. If the Court had found that state labels
were to control, the states could of course have relabeled
offenses to gain Travel Act coverage. Yet, it seems un-
likely that Congress would predicate the uniform opera-
tion of a federal statute upon the willingness and ability
of states to change their criminal law codifications.
86 Id. at 296.
87 511 F.2d at 956, citing 393 U.S. at 292, 293.
88 Id. at 957, citing 393 U.S. at 296.
89 580 F.2d at 734.
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The Second Circuit's opinion in Brecht evidences
a much more well-reasoned reading of Nardello.90
Rather than simply repeating the conclusions of
the United States Supreme Court, and inserting
bribery for the word extortion, the Second Circuit
surveyed the reasoning which led to the Supreme
Court's conclusion, and looked to see how it applied
to the court's construction of the term bribery.
A significant factor leading to the rejection of
the common-law definition of extortion in Nardello
was that such a reading would have undermined
the congressional effort to prosecute extortion by
organized criminals.9' The limitation of bribery to
its common-law meaning would not similarly un-
dermine the congressional desire to prosecute brib-
ery by organized criminals, for that meaning-the
bribery of public officials-describes the typical
form bribery takes when perpetrated by organized
crime.0 2 An inability to prosecute commercial brib-
ery is of little consequence since it is not typically
a feature of organized crime.93 Thus, to give bribery
its common-law meaning would not amount to an
unnaturally narrow reading of the word in light of
the scope of the congressional purpose.
Moreover, the Second Circuit read Nardello as
emphasizing that "the inquiry into whether the
state violation committed by the defendant comes
within the scope of the Travel Act depends not
upon the nomenclature used, but upon the nature
of the violation." 9' Inasmuch as the nature of the
violation with which Congress seemed concerned
was the bribery of public officials, the Travel Act
would apply so long as a state had a statute relating
to the corruption of public officials, regardless of
whether it referred specifically to bribery of public
officials.95 The inclusion of violations of state law
simply because the statute used the word bribery
90 540 F.2d at 50.
9' See note 83 supra & accompanying text.
92 540 F.2d at 50.
9 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. But see United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 47
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). In light
of this analysis and Brecht, it seems that the Third Circuit
erroneously relied upon Nardello when it stated that
the Travel Act incorporates into federal law New
Jersey's substantive law of bribery ... even though
it contains a more expansive definition of the crime
than that found at common law. The Travel Act
does not reach only those state offenses which would
have constituted the crimes of "extortion, bribery,
arson" at common law. Rather, all state offenses
which can be generically classified under those
headings fall within its purview.
was, according to the Second Circuit, the sort of
literalism rejected in Nardello.9
It appears that the Second Circuit's reading of
Nardello is preferable to that of the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits. Rather than focusing blindly on the
Supreme Court's conclusions, the Brecht court care-
fully applied Nardello's reasoning to the question of
the meaning of bribery. Its observations that the
common-law definition of bribery is consistent with
the congressional purpose underlying the Travel
Act, and that the adoption of a broad generic
definition of bribery would lead to a tyranny of
state labels, are telling criticisms of the Pomponio
and Perrin decisions.
9 7
In addition to describing the geographic non-
uniformity which would result from a broad ge-
neric definition of bribery, such an expansive def-
inition would make commercial bribery a major
federal felony in those states which have commer-
cial bribery statutes.ss Not only did merely one-
half the states have commercial bribery statutes at
the time the Travel Act was passed, but potential
prison terms for violation of general commercial
bribery statutei varied from six months to no more
than one year.9 Since the passage of the Travel
Act, New York has reduced the maximum possible
imprisonment for commercial bribery to three
months." ° On the other hand, bribery of a public
servant in New York exposes the offender to a-
maximum of seven years' imprisonment. 10' Thus,
in New York, there is less incongruity in making
bribery of a public official a federal offense punish-
able by up to five years' imprisonment, than there
is in making commercial bribery a Travel Act
offense. While there is no doubt that Congress has
the power to achieve such a result,' 02 the pertinent
question is, did it intend such a result in this
9 Id. 540 F.2d at 50.
97 See text accompanying notes 90-95 supra.
98 356 F.Supp. at 982.
9 Id. Arizona, California, Montana, and New Jersey
each allowed more than one year of imprisonment for
violation of their limited commercial bribery statutes.
Note, Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Leg-
islation, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848, 864, 866 (1960).
'0o N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.15 (McKinney 1975).
101 See note 29 supra.
2 United States v. Brennan, 394 F.2d 151, 153 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 839 (1968); In United States v.
Karigiannis, 430 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 904 (1970), the court observed that the indictment
need not distinguish the unlawful extortion as being
either a misdemeanor or a felony, for "the gravamen of
a charge under § 1952 is the violation of federal law and
,reference to state law is necessary only to identify the
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instance?"° a One court faced with this question
could "find absolutely no evidence that the Con-
gress harbored any such intent."10
4
The propriety of taking into account this drastic
elevation of state misdemeanors to federal felonies
in deciding whether Congress intended bribery to
include commercial bribery is supported by the
following quotation from Rewis v. United States,I10 a
case focusing upon whether the interstate travel
nexus of the Travel Act had been met when the
only interstate activity was the travel of patrons to
an illegal gambling establishment:
In addition we are struck by what Congress did not
say. Given the ease with which citizens of our nation
are able to travel and the existence of many multi-
state metropolitan areas, substantial amounts of
criminal activity, traditionally subject to state reg-
ulation, are patronized by out-of-state customers. In
such a context, Congress would surely recognize
that an expansive Travel Act would alter sensitive
federal-state relationships, could overextend limited
federal police resources, and might well produce
situations in which the geographic origin of cus-
tomers, a matter of happenstance, would transform
relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies.
It is not for us to weigh the merits of these factors,
but the fact that they are not even discussed in the
legislative history of § 1952 strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend that the Travel Act should
apply to criminal activity solely because it is at
times patronized by persons from another State. In
short, neither statutory language nor legislative his-
tory supports such a broad-ranging interpretation
of§ 1952.'06
type of unlawful activity in which the defendants intend
to engage."' But this does not preclude a court from
considering the classification of an offense by states when
the court is attempting to determine the ambit of an
ambiguous federal statute, rather than merely applying
a clear enactment. See also United States v. Garramone,
380 F.Supp. 590, 593 (E.D.Pa. 1974).
0s3 356 F.Supp. at 982.
104 Ld.
'05 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
'o6 401 U.S. at 811-12. There is a split in the United
States Courts of Appeals regarding the degree of use of
interstate facilities which is necessary to establish federal
jurisdiction under the Travel Act. Part of the reason for
the split is apparently the differing interpretations of the
import of the quotation cited in the text. Some courts
regard the factors stated as limiting the language of the
Travel Act, while other courts feel the factors were con-
sidered in deciding whether the Act's reach should extend
beyond the plain meaning of the language. See Conner,
supra note 5, at 508-21; Comment, The Continuing Debate
Over Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Travel Act, 60
IowA L. REv. 1401, 1406-15 (1975). Regardless of which
view is correct, given that the language we are attempting
Although there is not extensive discussion in the
congressional committee hearings of the factors the
Rewis Court believed the Congress would have
carefully considered had it wished an expansive
application of the Travel Act, there are references
to the possibility of the escalation of state misde-
meanors to federal felonies,10 7 the problem of cap-
turing too many petty local offenses in the federal
enforcement effort,1os the alteration of the federal-
state balance, 10 and the overextension of federal
police resources
10
The fact that the Travel Act was passed virtually
intact in the face of criticism that many petty local
violations not perpetrated by organized crime
would be covered, suggests that perhaps Congress-
men, in spite of the overbreadth, were simply
willing to let the Department of Justice have the
weapon it wanted to fight organized crime."' Yet,
the misgivings which were voiced about the
breadth of the legislation, 2 also lead to the con-
clusion that when a narrow reading of the Act
would serve the Justice Department's purposes, it
ought to be given that meaning. Thus, if reading
bribery in its common-law sense would adequately
serve the Justice Department's fight against orga-
nized crime, the term should not be defined so as
to escalate commercial bribery to the status of a
federal felony.
CONCLUSION
In construing the meaning of a doubtful term in
a statute, one should properly take into account
to construe is ambiguous and one cannot be certain of its
ambit, it seems entirely appropriate to give consideration
to these factors which the United States Supreme Court
utilized in analyzing the reach of the Travel Act.
117 See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 322 (testimony of
Howard M. Holtzman, New York County Lawyers As-
sociation), 50 (statement of Professor Louis B. Schwartz,
University of Pennsylvania Law School), 162 (Report of
National Association of Defense Lawyers in Criminal
Cases on Proposed Federal Antiracketeering Legislation).
"o See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 50, 62 (statement
of Professor Louis B. Schwartz); 159 (Report of National
Association of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases); Senate
Hearings, supra note 3, at 266 (testimony of Assistant
Attorney General Miller, comments of Senator Ervin).
" Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 260, 261 (colloquy
between Senator Carroll and Assistant Attorney General
Miller).
"'Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 113 (testimony of
.Assistant Attorney General Miller).
.' See United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 885, 886
(9th Cir. 1970).
"
2 See text accompanying notes 107 & 108 supra. See
also Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 266 (remarks of
Senator Ervin).
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whatever evidence sheds light on the meaning
intended by Congress.13 In looking to the legisla-
tive history of the Travel Act and the circumstances
surrounding its enactment, a definitive anwer to
the question of the meaning of bribery in the
Travel Act is not apparent. Yet, the suggestion is
strong that Congress had in mind the bribery of
public officials, the typical form of bribery prac-
ticed by organized criminals, when it used the
term.1
14
The construction of the term extortion by the
Supreme Court in Nardello also lends support to the
contention that bribery should be given its com-
mon-law meaning. The Second Circuit recognized
in Brecht that such a reading would be consistent
with the congressional purpose underlying the
Travel Act, and would avoid the literalism rejected
in Nardello.15 Just as the Second Circuit's analysis
of the meaning of bribery was strengthened by its
application of Nardello, the Fourth and Fifth Cir-
cuits' opinions suffer from their misapplication of
it.116
In addition, the factors cited in Rewis counsel
against a needlessly broad reading of bribery." 7 A
113 United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969).
14 See text accompanying notes 56-64 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.116 See text accompanying notes 87-89, 97, supra.
1 7 See text accompanying notes 105-12 supra.
broad generic construction of the term would divert
federal police resources, raise state misdemeanors
to federal felonies, and alter, to some extent, fed-
eral-state relations, all without a clear indication
that the purpose of Congress in enacting the Travel
Act would be served."1
8
The evidence discussed does not permit a defin-
itive answer that Congress intended bribery to have
one meaning or another. While circumstances sug-
gest that Congress was probably focusing upon the
bribery of public officials, one cannot be sure that
Congress intended to restrict the definition in such
a manner. Though this inquiry into the back-
ground of the Travel Act has suggested a probable
meaning, uncertainty remains. Now that resort has
been had to the statute's purpose, legislative his-
tory, and other constructional aids, the doctrine of
strict construction must be allowed to determine
the outcome."' The ambiguity in the ambit of this
penal statute must be resolved in favor of lenity to
the accused'20 Therefore, bribery should be re-
stricted to its meaning at common law, that is, the
bribery of public officials.
D. BRUCE GABRIEL
.. See text accompanying notes 111, 112 supra.
19 See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
12 United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396,411 (1973);
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
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